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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Duaine Frederick Earl appeals, pro se, from the summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The relevant facts as outlined by the district court in its memorandum 
decision are as follows: 
Duaine Fredrick Earl was sentenced on March 6, 2000 after 
pleading guilty to violating I.C. 18-6101(1), rape. The court 
sentenced Mr. Earl to a unified sentence of ten (10) years with one 
(1) year determinate, but retained jurisdiction. Mr. Earl was granted 
supervised probation upon returning from his rider but later violated 
that probation. 
A report of the probation violation was filed on or about May 
7, 2002 and Mr. Earl later failed to appear to his evidentiary hearing 
regarding that violation. Mr. Earl was later apprehended and 
admitted to violating his probation. Mr. Earl then had his original 
sentence imposed on November 25, 2002 and he was granted 
credit for time served. The amount of time credited was left out of 
the original Order on Motion to Revoke Probation dated December 
2, 2002, but based upon a stipulation by the parties in this action 
the time credited is 232 days. 
Mr. Earl has filed an application for post-conviction relief and 
the State has moved for Summary Dismissal of the matter. Mr. Earl 
is asserting that he should be granted credit for time served on 
probation, and as such he should be released immediately as his 
full term release date under that calculation would have been 
February 24, 2010. 
(R., pp.89-90.) 
Following a hearing on the state's motion for summary judgment, the court 
granted the state's motion and dismissed Earl's petition for post-conviction relief 
1 
finding no genuine issue of material fact. (R., pp.89-96.) Earl timely appealed. 1 
(R., pp.100-102.) 
1 The State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") was originally appointed to 
represent Earl in his appeal. (R., pp.105-108.) The SAPD subsequently withdrew 
from the representation of Earl based on its position that "[a]fter a thorough 
review, each of the three attorneys were unable to identify a viable issue for 
appeal." (Affidavit in Support of Motion For Leave to Withdraw And Motion to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule, p. 2.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Earl states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Assistance of counsel as enunciated within the body of the 
sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution; 
II. Subjection to double jeopardy for the same offense void of due 
process of law or just compensation; 
111. Rights to due process of law and equal protection under the 
law as guaranteed within the fifth and fourteenth amendments to 
the U.S. Constitution; 
IV. Adherence to affording full faith and credit to judicial 
proceedings and to records enumerated in article four section 1 of 
the U.S. Constitution; 
V. The right to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances asserted within the first amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution; 
VI. Rights to be free of excessive fines and cruel and unusual 
punishments as enunciated in the eighth amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and Idaho State Constitution, article 1 section 6; 
VII. Rights retained and reserved by the people as is enunciated 
within the ninth and tenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 
Idaho State Constitution article 1 sections 1, 13, & 18; 
VI 11. Adherence to Idaho statutes, i.e. titles 20-209A and 19-2603. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-5 (verbatim).) 
The state rephrases the issue as follows: 
Has Earl failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Earl Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Summarily 
Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
The state moved for summary dismissal of Earl's petition for post-
conviction relief, asserting Earl's claims regarding credit for time served, an 
alleged violation of his double jeopardy rights, and an alleged violation of the 
sentencing reform act were "bare and conclusory statements unsubstantiated by 
fact" and they "fail[ed] to raise a genuine issue of material fact. " (R., p.49.) Earl, 
through counsel, then filed an "Addendum Brief' addressing the issue of credit for 
time served. (R., pp.66-78.) Following a hearing, the district court granted the 
state's motion for summary judgment "[a]fter review of the record and finding no 
genuine issue of material fact." (R., p.95.) 
On appeal, Earl reasserts his original claims that he did not receive proper 
credit for time served, his sentence violated his rights against double jeopardy, 
was cruel and unusual, and violated his due process protections. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.4-5.) 
Earl's arguments on appeal fail. He has not shown that the district court 
erred in summarily dismissing his post-conviction relief petition. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's 
application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001). On appeal from summary 
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dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to 
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v. 
State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely 
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, 
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
C. Earl Has Waived Consideration Of Claims Not Raised In His Petition 
For Post-Conviction Relief 
Earl raises new claims for the first time on appeal. He now asserts there 
were "numerous causes and violations of [his] constitutional rights, including, but 
not limited to, the right to effective assistance of counsel throughout all legal 
proceedings," he did not receive the benefit of "full faith and credit to judicial 
proceedings," and his first, ninth and tenth amendment rights were violated. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-5).) These claims were not asserted in his petition. (R., 
p.2.) 
It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a claim not raised before the 
district court will not be considered on appeal. State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 
398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Because these issues were not asserted in 
Earl's petition for post-conviction relief, they are not properly before this Court on 
appeal. 
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D. Earl Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In 
Summarily Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction 
relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain 
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 
8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and 
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. ~ (citing I.C. § 19-
4903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application 
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); 
Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises 
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no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing l.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001 )). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, 
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing 
the petition. kl (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting 
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." kl 
In its order granting the state's motion for summary judgment and 
dismissing Earl's petition for post-conviction relief, the district court articulated the 
applicable legal standards (R., pp.90-92) and set forth, in detail, the reasons Earl 
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on any of his claims (R., pp.92-
95). The state adopts the district court's written opinion as its argument on 
appeal, a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A. Earl does not 
specifically challenge any of the court's findings or legal conclusions (see 
generally Appellant's Brief), and he has otherwise failed to establish the district 
court erred in dismissing his petition. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Earl's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 19th day of February 201 . 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of February 2013, I caused two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed 
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
DUAINE FREDRICK EARL 
144 W. 100 S. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Duaine Fredrick Earl, 
Defendant. 
DOB: 
Case No. CV-2011-0697 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Duaine Fredrick Earl was sentenced on March 6, 2000 after pleading guilty to 
violating J.C. 18-6101(1), rape. The court sentenced Mr. Earl to a unified sentence often 
(10) years with one (1) year determinate, but retained jurisdiction. Mr. Earl was granted 
supervised probation upon returning from his rider but later violated that probation. 
A report of the probation violation was filed on or about May 7, 2002 and Mr. 
Earl later failed to appear to his evidentiary hearing regarding that violation. Mr. Earl was 
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later apprehended and admitted to violating his probation. Mr. Earl then had his original 
sentence imposed on November 25, 2002 and he was granted credit for time served. The 
amount of time credited was left out of the original Order on Motion to Revoke Probation 
dated December 2, 2002, but based upon a stipulation by the parties in this action the 
time credited is 232 days. 
Mr. Earl has filed an application for post-conviction relief and the State has 
moved for Swnmary Dismissal of the matter. Mr. Earl is asserting that he should be 
granted credit for time served on probation, and as such he should be released 
immediately as his full term release date under that calculation would have been February 
24, 2010. Mr. Earl bases this conclusion on five separate grounds, but for the reasons set 
forth below this court disagrees with his assertions and grants the State's Motion for 
Summary Dismissal. 
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Post-Conviction Standards 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding, which is civil in 
nature. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830 
(1969); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921 (Ct. App. 1992). An application for post-
conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action in that it must 
contain more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint under I.RC.P. 8(a)(l). Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Rather an application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts 
within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records, or other evidence 
supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such 
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supporting evidence is not included with the application. J.C.§ 19-4903. Like a plaintiff 
in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations 
upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. J.C. § 19-4907; Russell v. 
State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The post-conviction petitioner must make factual allegations showing each 
essential element of the claim and a showing of admissible evidence must support those 
factual allegations. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647 (Ct App. 1994); Drapeau v. 
State, 103 Idaho 612, 617 (Ct. App. l 982); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822 (Ct. App. l 985). 
The district court may take judicial notice of the record of the underlying criminal case. 
Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd 115 Idaho 315 (1988), overruled 
on other grounds State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992). 
B. Summary Dismissal Standards 
Idaho Code § 19-4906( c) authorizes summary disposition of an application for 
post-conviction relief. Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to I.C. 19-4906( c) is 
the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. State v. LePage, 138 
Idaho 803, 806 (Ct. App. 2003). Summary dismissal of an application is permissible 
when "there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law''. I.C. § 19-4906( c ). If such a genuine issue of material fact is 
presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 
763 (Ct. App. 1991); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Conversely, the "application must present or be accompanied by admissible 
evidence supporting its allegations or the application will be subject to dismissal." 
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 (Ct. App. 2002) review denied (2003); LePage, 
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138 Idaho at 807 (citing Roman, 125 Idaho at 647); Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897 (Ct. 
App. 1995); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826 (Ct. App. 1985). Allegations are 
insufficient for the grant of relief when they do not justify relief as a matter of law. Stuart 
v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869 (1990); Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545 (1975); 
Remington v. State, 127 Idaho 443, 446-47 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any facts, are inadequate to 
entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Roman, 125 Idaho at 647; Baruth v. 
Gardner, 1 IO Idaho 156, 159 (Ct App. 1986); Stone, 108 Idaho at 826. If a petitioner 
fails to present evidence establishing an essential element on which he bears the burden 
of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588,592 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
III. ANALYSIS 
Reviewing the record in this case and the assertions made by Mr. Earl it is 
apparent that this is a matter of law and that no material facts are in dispute. There is no 
dispute as to the dates that Mr. Earl was imprisoned and the dates he was on probation. 
Rather, the dispute is centered on whether the time Mr .. Earl was on probation or parole is 
to be considered as credit for time served. Mr. Earl claims that his assertion is supported 
on five different grounds, which shall be addressed in order. 
A. Violations of I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-209A 
Mr. Earl asserts that to not include his time on probation or parole would be 
violations of I.C. §§ 19-2603 and 20-209A, as he was not voluntarily absent from the 
control of the board of correction while on probation. It is clear from Mr. Earl's assertion 
regarding control that he has misinterpreted the plain language of the statutes and has 
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ignored the controlling authority; Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866 (Ct.App.2008) and State 
v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832 (Ct.App.1987) are directly contrary to petitioner's claim. 
I.C. § 20-209A states: 
When a person is sentenced to the custody of the board of correction, his term of 
confinement begins from the day of his sentence. A person who is sentenced may 
receive credit toward service of his sentence for time spent in physical custody 
pending trial or sentencing, or appeal, if that detention was in connection with the 
offense for which the sentence was imposed. The time during which the person is 
voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of the 
board of correction, or from the custody of an officer after his sentence, shall not 
be estimated or counted as a part of the term for which he was sentenced. 
The plain language of this statute makes it clear that time spent on probation or 
parole is not to be included as credit for time served. Probation and parole are times that a 
person is voluntarily absent from a facility, jail, or penitentiary that is under the control of 
the board of corrections. The language is obvious that it is a physical structure (i.e. 
penitentiary, jail, or facility) that must be under the control of the board of correction 
which a person must be voluntarily absent from. The statute makes no mention of any 
individual person being under the control of the board of correction as Mr. Earl asserts. 
Also being on probation or parole is not being under the custody of an officer, as custody 
and supervision are two very different concepts. 
Under the plain language of I.C. 20-209A it is obvious that probation and parole 
are considered being voluntarily absent from a physical structure that is under the control 
of the board of correction and that it is not being under the custody of an officer. Mr. 
Earl's perverted interpretation of the statute has no legal support, and Idaho case law is 
clear that Mr. Earl's time on supervised probation and parole does not qualify as credit 
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fortiine served. See I.C. §18-309; I.C. §19-2603; see also Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 
869-870 (Ct.App.2008); State v. Sutton, 113 Idaho 832 (Ct.App.1987). 
B. Violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
Mr. Earl asserts that not having his time on probation and parole calculated as part 
of his credit for time served would in effect extend the length of his maximum sentence, 
and as such is a new punishment for the same crime. He claims that his probation/parole 
violations were matters involving the same parties from his original sentencings on the 
underlying crimes and that the issues had been previously determined by a valid and final 
judgment. For these reasons, Mr. Earl asserts that his United States 5th Amendment right 
against double jeopardy has been violated. This is incorrect. 
The United States 5th Amendment right against double jeopardy protects a person 
from being prosecuted a second time for the same offense after acquittal or conviction. It 
also protects an individual from multiple punishments for the same offense. 
In this case, Mr. Earl received a unified sentence often years during the original 
sentencing, a sentence that was later suspended when Mr. Earl was put on probation. Mr. 
Earl's probation was revoked after he violated the terms and conditions of probation 
resulting in the imposition of the original sentence. The same occurred when his parole 
was revoked. 
In no way is this prosecuting Mr. Earl a second time for the same offense, nor is 
it another punishment for the same offense. Rather, Mr. Earl was given an opportunity to 
avoid the imposition of his original sentence; an opportunity that he squandered by 
violating probation. As such, Mr. Earl's claim that his United States 5th Amendment right 
against double jeopardy was violated has no legal support and is dismissed. 
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C. Violation of 14th Amendment Rights 
After review of this matter, this Court has found no violation of Mr. Earl's 14th 
Amendment Rights. Mr. Earl was afforded due process in every action against him and 
the court acted lawfully throughout the course of this matter. Mr. Earl has offered no 
legal support for this claim and as such it too is dismissed. 
D. Violation of Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
Mr. Earl's claim of a violation of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is based on 
his misunderstanding of the law and he offers no legal support to help his cause. The 
court lawfully imposed a sentence and then lawfully suspended that sentence to give Mr. 
Earl the opportunity to prove himself on probation. After Mr. Earl failed on probation he 
then had the original sentence imposed. All of the court's actions were in accordance 
with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Mr. Earl's mischaracterization of the legal 
precedent regarding this Act offers no support whatsoever for his claims and as such this 
claim is dismissed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
After review of the record and finding no genuine issue of material fact, this court 
finds that summary dismissal is appropriate in this matter. The legal merits of this case all 
fall in favor of the State, and as such their Motion for Summary Dismissal is GRANTED. 
(.., 
Dated this 1(1 day of February, 2012 
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